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Abstract
This paper analyzes the unconditional measurement of default risk and proposes an alternative modeling approach.
We begin the analysis by showing that when conducted under non-stationarity, the objective of the unconditional
measurement changes and that some relevant problems appear as a consequence of the sample dependence. Based on
this result, we introduce our approach and discuss its consistency, practical advantages, and the main differences from
the conventional static framework. An empirical analysis is also conducted. Under non-stationarity, the regulatory
model for the unconditional probability of default distribution performs badly when compared to our approach. Results
also show that the capital figure presents a determinant and non-trivial dependence on the homogeneity and severity of
the economic scenario represented in the sample.
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1. Introduction
It has been acknowledged that banks and the economies
in which they operate benefit from stable capital require-
ments over the business cycle. Thus, capital stability re-
duces adjustment costs for banks, Estrella (2004), and
helps to smoothe the business cycle, Drumond (2009). The
latter is considered appropriate from a macro-prudential
perspective, so both the Basel II, BCBS (2006), and Basel
III, BCBS (2011), frameworks assume the principle of cap-
ital stability, although with questionable success, Repullo
and Suarez (2008).
Regarding default risk, the ideal of stability has led to
a long-term approach to the probability of default (PD)
of each type of debtor included in the portfolio, BCBS
(2009). This kind of PD attempts to represent a neutral
risk profile instead of the real spot default risk prevailing in
each point of the business cycle, Gordy and Howells (2006).
Due to the cyclical nature of default risk, Festic et al.
(2011), the former is not, in terms of creditworthiness, as
good as the latter in expansions nor as bad in recessions.
The use of a long-term PD results in a non-cyclical or
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unconditional default risk measurement, and therefore in
unconditional capital requirements for the credit portfolio.
Unconditional means here that the risk profile represented
in the PD is not subjected to any specific state of the
business cycle, as opposed to the conditional measurement,
which does reflect a specific economic environment.
In spite of its central role in banking regulation and
its widespread use by the industry, the fundamentals of
the unconditional measurement are not yet entirely clear,
especially if the portfolio exhibits non-stationary default
risk. Resorting to intuition, it is natural to think that
if there is no stationary default risk, the word uncondi-
tional cannot have the same meaning in risk terms than
it has in probabilistic terms, and that some limitations
may appear. Once this issue arises, the contiguous prob-
lems of (i) modeling an unconditional PD distribution co-
herently with such limitations, and (ii) understanding the
effects of the non-stationarity over the resulting capital es-
timate, immediately surface. Again, intuitively, the stan-
dard techniques for characterizing the marginal distribu-
tions of stationary processes must be avoided in (i), while
the irregularity and sample dependence produced by the
non-stationarity are expected to be relevant in (ii).
The aim of this paper is to explore these issues from the
perspective of the conditional measurement, whose funda-
mentals are clear and do not present blind spots under
non-stationarity. In other words, we follow a conditional
approach to the unconditional measurement. This novel
view allows us to contribute to each of these three issues.
First, we discuss the concept of unconditional measure-
ment under non-stationarity with focus on the uncondi-
tional PD distribution. We conclude that it has to be
interpreted as a measurement that relies on a balanced
economic scenario and that is, in fact, an unconditional
measurement conditional on the sample used. Such sam-
ple dependence generates problems of comparability, sta-
bility, and even capital arbitrage opportunities. The static
modeling approach, which implicitly obviates this fact, is
questioned.
Second, we propose an alternative modeling approach
to the unconditional PD distribution. It is based on the
conditional PD distributions and avoids any explicit or
implicit assumption of stationarity. The term “approach”
instead of “model” indicates its general nature, which is
not restricted to any specific statistical formulation. We
discuss its relationship with the literature, flexibility, and
coherence.
Third, we conduct an empirical analysis based on Amer-
ican data. Results show that the non-stationarity induces
multimodal PD distributions. The model of Vasicek, which
underpins the regulatory framework, handles this feature
badly, while our approach captures it properly and parsi-
moniously. On the other hand, the unconditional capital
presents a significant sensitivity to the homogeneity and
severity of the economic scenario captured in the sample.
The former produces lower capital figures under the Great
Recession than in a more balanced scenario, while the lat-
ter is caused by the cyclicality of the conditional PD dis-
tributions’ variance.
On the basis of these results—conceptual discussion,
methodological proposal, and empirical study—we suggest
rethinking the unconditional measurement of default risk,
especially regarding the regulatory framework.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
2 briefly reviews the analytical framework used, and Sec-
tion 3 discusses the meaning and limitations of the uncon-
ditional measurement under non-stationarity. Section 4
presents the proposed approach to the unconditional PD
distribution, Section 5 discusses its properties, and Sec-
tion 6 describes the empirical exercises and their results.
Section 7 provides a conclusion. Appendix A presents the
proof for a result obtained in the body of the paper.
2. Loss model review
Discussing unconditional measurement requires the for-
mulation of a loss model and a brief review of its main fea-
tures. For this purpose, we assume a standard framework
in which time is measured discretely at regular intervals
that, for simplicity, match the time horizon used by the
bank to measure the default risk of its credit portfolio1.
1However, our analysis can easily be extended to the multi-period
framework, Duffie et al. (2007).
In practice, this time horizon is usually a year, but no spe-
cific assumptions about it are made. We also assume that
the only source of loss for the bank is its credit portfolio.
As a portfolio model, we consider a default-event, constant-
exposure, conditional-independence formulation, see Gordy
(2000) and Frey and McNeil (2003). This model is formu-
lated as follows:
L =
N∑
j=1
Lj =
N∑
j=1
Mj∑
i=1
Lji =
N∑
j=1
Mj∑
i=1
Berji
(
F j
)
eji (1)
where N is the number of risk units, formed by homoge-
neous groups of debtors, eji is the net exposure of each
debtor, eji > 0, and Berji is the Bernoulli random vari-
able that takes a value of 1 if the debtor defaults and 0
otherwise. M j is the number of debtors assigned to the
risk unit j, with M =
∑N
j=1M
j being the total number of
debtors of the portfolio. Lji, Lj and L are the loss distri-
butions of debtor i from risk unit j, the loss distribution
of the risk unit j and the loss distribution of the entire
portfolio, respectively. F j is the PD of risk unit j dur-
ing the time horizon. It is a continuous random variable
with support in (0 1), with F =
(
F 1, ..., FN
)
being the
continuous multivariate PD random vector with support
in (0 1)
N
. The loss experienced by the bank during the
time horizon is then a fraction of E =
∑N
j=1
∑Mj
i=1 e
ji.
The capital, or unexpected loss, k, of the portfolio is
assumed to be k = η − µ, where µ = E [L], and η is
the Value at Risk (VaR) of L, P (L ≤ η) = u, with u,
0 < u < 1, being its pre-defined coverage level2.
The capital estimate strongly depends on the choice of
PD distribution. F is, in fact, the core of the loss model
presented in Eq. 1 since it establishes its asymptotic prop-
erties, Gordy (2003). In practice, two main types of F
distribution are employed, each related to a different type
of default risk measurement.
On the one hand, the conditional PD distribution, Ft =(
F 1t , ..., F
N
t
)
. Ft produces a conditional measurement that
represents the economic situation prevailing3 in period t
by incorporating all the available information up to t− 1.
On the other hand, the unconditional PD distribu-
tion, F ∗ =
(
F ∗1, ..., F ∗N
)
. F ∗ produces an unconditional
measurement that represents a full-business-cycle scenario.
This kind of scenario, as opposed to the conditional one,
is a synthetic construction mixing periods of both growth
and recession in a proportion similar to that observed dur-
ing a standard business cycle.
While the conditional measurement relies on a dynamic
modeling, the unconditional measurement usually makes
2Unexpected loss can be defined in terms of other risk measures,
like the expected shortfall (ES), see Tasche (2002). However, we
base our discussion, without loss of generality, on the VaR due to its
prominent position in risk management.
3Although we do not consider them, hypothetical conditional sce-
narios can also be used, as occurs in stress test exercises, see Sorge
and Virolainen (2006).
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use of a more static approach. However, both Ft and F
∗
are identified on the grounds of the portfolio hazard rates,
ht =
(
h1t , ..., h
N
t
)
. hjt represents the default frequency rate
observed in risk unit j at period t.
Thus, Ft is given by the conditional distribution of ht
in t given all the information up to t−1, Ht. Therefore, the
identification of Ft usually requires the prior identification
of a dynamic model for ht, as in Pesaran et al. (2006).
The identification of F ∗ relies on the observation of ht
over a long period, or time window, represented hereinafter
by the interval t = 1, ..., T . The time window should in-
clude, under the full-business-cycle principle, recessions
and expansions to avoid biases. Related to this time win-
dow there is a matrix of observed hazard rates per period
and risk unit. The conventional static approach is then to
fit a distribution with support in (0 1)
N
to this matrix. A
well-known unconditional PD distribution is the model of
Vasicek, Vasicek (2002), denoted by V =
(
V 1, ..., V N
)
:
V j = N
(
N−1
(
θj
)−√ρjzj√
1− ρj
)
(2)
where 0 < θj < 1, 0 < ρj < 1 and z =
(
z1, ..., zN
) ∼
NN ((0, ..., 0) ; Σ) with Σ (j, j) = 1, j = 1, ..., N .
This model enjoys a notorious position among the PD
models used in the industry, BCBS (2009), and several
extensions have been proposed, Burtschell et al. (2007). It
is also the basis of the regulatory model for default risk,
this time presented as the Asymptotic Single Risk Factor
(ASRF) model, which is equivalent to Eq. 2 settting zj =
z, j = 1, ..., N .
3. Unconditional measurement and non-stationarity
In probabilistic terms, the unconditional PD distribu-
tion can be understood as the marginal distribution of ht,
H∗ =
(
H∗1, ...,H∗N
)
. Since the marginal distribution is
not subjected to the information available at any period,
but reflects the long-term behavior of the process, it can
be informally seen as a mix of the different stages that
form the business cycle.
Obviously, if ht is not stationary, then such marginal
distribution does not exist, so it is not possible to define
the unconditional PD distribution in this way. In other
words, F ∗ is an unconditional PD distribution conditional
on the hazard rate sample observed during the time win-
dow, and only if ht is stationary and the time window
is long enough that F ∗ can be considered truly uncondi-
tional. If this happens, F ∗ is expected to converge4 to the
marginal distribution H∗.
If this is not the case5, then there is no convergence
and therefore explicit or implicit assumptions about the
4We assume throughout the paper that ht is ergodic.
5Since 0 < hjt < 1, the hazard rate cannot be purely non-
stationary although it can behave as if it is, Nicolau (2002). For
the sake of simplicity, however, we follow Hall et al. (1992) and omit
existence of a long-term representation of the hazard rate
series should be avoided. This fact translates directly into
the capital figure, for which there is no marginal represen-
tation either.
This fact means that under non-stationarity, the mean-
ing and objective of the unconditional measurement change.
Thus, the idea of capturing the portfolio’s long-term de-
fault risk must now be substituted with the idea of repre-
senting the default risk related to an equilibrated economic
scenario, one incorporating both expansions and recessions
in a balanced mix. In other words, unconditional capital
simply means capital derived from a balanced economic
scenario. The adjective “unconditional” is, in fact, an in-
formal, or even allegorical, use and abuse of a term that
loses its true meaning under non-stationarity.
Although it could be argued that the sample depen-
dence problem has long been a concern in risk modeling,
the truth is that regarding unconditional measurement, it
produces relevant effects that are not yet properly under-
stood or even fully acknowledged. This is the case with
the static approach: Fitting a distribution to a large re-
alization of a stochastic process only makes sense if such
process is stationary. Otherwise, this kind of identification
process for F ∗, although still applicable, lacks any theo-
retical basis. Yet the static approach is no other but the
one on which the regulatory framework relies. In fact, nei-
ther Basel II nor Basel III have addressed the stationarity
issue in detail, although it affects the estimation of the
TtC (Through the Cycle) PD, which is the parameter θj
in Eq. 2.
Regarding the literature, Dan´ıelsson (2002) highlights
the general problems that any risk management process
encounters due to the recurrent structural changes exhib-
ited by financial variables, but it focuses on the problem of
endogenous response and does not discuss the relationship
between unconditional measurement and non-stationarity.
Lucas and Klaassen (2006), Ro¨sch and Scheule (2010),
Carey (2002) and Bangia et al. (2002) observe that the risk
metrics depend on the economic scenario reflected in the
sample, or, equivalently, in the time window, but do not
discuss the implications of this dependence for the uncon-
ditional measurement. Jarrow and Turnbull (2000) note
that the implicit assumption of stationarity behind the
commercial solution of KMV, Crosbie and Bohn (2003),
can be seen as a deficiency, which is a criticism that can
be generalized to other commercial solutions, like those
analyzed by Crouhy et al. (2000). However, this remark
is not subjected to further analysis. In other works this
issue is virtually dodged, even if a dynamic modeling for
the hazard rates is considered, as in Wilson (1997a,b) and
Lee and Poon (2014).
this controversial issue. Moreover, hazard rate series are often de-
fined in terms of another unbounded process, xt, being h
j
t = ϕ
(
xjt
)
,
with ϕ : R→ (0 1) being a continuous function. Our discussion can,
in turn, be extrapolated to xjt .
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The influence of the time window in the unconditional
measurement constitutes a marked difference between sta-
tionarity and non-stationarity. Thus, if ht is stationary
there is no inconsistency as the longer the time window,
the closer the unconditional PD distribution is to the haz-
ard rates’ marginal distribution. That means that choos-
ing the largest available time window is a simple and op-
timal criterion to represent a full-business-cycle scenario.
Moreover, due to this convergence, the lower and upper
limits of the time window are not relevant beyond the to-
tal length that they determine.
But if ht is not stationary, then it is not clear that
the best choice to achieve a balanced time window is to
use the largest available one. Banks then must choose the
proper mix of expansion and recession periods that results
in a full-business-cycle time window. This critical decision
influences the resulting unconditional capital as it does any
other modeling option, although in a less evident way.
In addition to the difficulty of dealing with the vague
concept of full-business-cycle time window, two practical
problems appear under non-stationarity.
First, if setting the time window is not as simple as
just considering the largest sample available, a more elab-
orate updating process is required with the observation
of new hazard rate values. These can be added to the
time window, which increases its length, or be used to re-
place the oldest values. The goal is to keep a proper full-
business-cycle representation as the prevailing time win-
dow becomes obsolete. Updating the time window in-
volves modifying the initial and final periods that define
it, which, under non-stationarity, may introduce instabil-
ity in the unconditional capital estimate, thereby harming
the ultimate objective of stability.
Second, comparing unconditional capital figures over
time, and, especially, across different banks, is of little
usefulness. Thus, different banks will probably follow dif-
ferent criteria to establish the full-business-cycle time win-
dow, which distort the comparison.
4. Proposed approach to the unconditional PD dis-
tribution
We denote our approach as Π =
(
Π1, ...,ΠN
)
. Π is
based on the collection of conditional PD distributions
{...,Ft, ...} generated by the realization of ht and it is
formed as the equally weighted mixture, or simply, mix-
ture, of those Ft included in the time window considered
by the bank. Thus, Π can be expressed as follows:
Π = {Ft}t=1,...,T ◦ I (3)
where I is a random variable that takes values 1, ..., T with
probability 1/T . {Ft}t=1,...,T is the set of conditional PD
distributions included in the time window. By relying
on them, the proposed approach (i) avoids any implicit
assumption of stationarity for ht, (ii) follows a dynamic
modeling, and (iii) reflects explicitly the evolution of the
portfolio’s default risk during the time window. These
three features make Π radically different from the tradi-
tional static framework.
5. Discussion of the proposed approach
Π constitutes a distinctive approach to unconditional
PD modeling. Still, some links to the literature can be
drawn. Thus, Pederzoli and Torricelli (2005) and Ban-
gia et al. (2002) form the unconditional distribution as
a weighted aggregation of distributions subjected to two
states of the economy, expansion and recession, each re-
ceiving a weight equal to the relative frequency of such
states over time. Π can be understood as an extreme case
of this framework that considers as many discrete states for
the economy as periods form the time window, all having a
weight 1/T . These periods implicitly represent recession,
expansion, or stagnation if that is what is exhibited by the
hazard rate series during the time window.
The proposed approach also resembles the resampling
methodology, Carey (1998), a non-parametric approach to
the PD distribution that relies on historical simulation.
Thus, the realization of I can be understood as a resam-
pling process over the set of T conditional scenarios im-
plicitly formed by the time window. According to this
interpretation, Π extends the re-sampling methodology
by adding uncertainty about the realization of the condi-
tional PD distributions themselves, this time in a stochas-
tic, rather than historical, simulation framework.
Π is a modular formulation, since it is obtained by
adding to the mixture those components Ft that best rep-
resent the economic scenario considered. This is a marked
difference from the flat static PD distributions, which are
directly fitted to the matrix of observed hazard rates. Thus,
the problem of representing a full-business-cycle scenario
is now the problem of choosing a proper combination of
conditional PD distributions related to expansions and re-
cessions. This modularity allows the bank to consider even
non-connected time windows6.
Another advantage of the modular structure is the pos-
sibility of easily representing economic scenarios other than
the full-business-cycle one. For stress test analysis, for ex-
ample, forming Π only with the distributions Ft related to
the downside of the business cycle can be useful. Π would
then be a PD distribution conditioned on a general down-
turn environment but not conditioned on any particular
type of recessive scenario.
Π dissociates the long- and short-term dependence be-
tween risk units. So, while the former is captured in a
non-parametric way through I, the latter is induced at
each period of the time window by the conditional PD dis-
tributions Ft, t = 1, ..., T . Since Ft is determined by the
dynamic model fitted to ht, this is only accountable for
the short-term dependence. Therefore, a dynamic model
6That is, time windows formed by non-consecutive time periods.
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that does not fully capture the long-term relationship be-
tween the hjt series can still be appropriate and preferable
to an excessively complex one.
The dynamic model fitted to the hazard rate series can
be understood as the “metaparameter” of the proposed
approach, since there is no restriction on its formulation.
Consequently, Π is a general approach to the uncondi-
tional PD distribution rather than a certain model. It
is worth noting that changing the time window does not
require re-identifying the dynamic model, but simply mod-
ifying the collection of conditional PD distributions that
form Π. By contrast, in the static approach any varia-
tion of the time window involves a variation in the ob-
served hazard rates matrix, and therefore demands the
re-identification of the distribution fitted to it.
Π produces an unconditional measurement coherent
with its natural probabilistic interpretation. Thus, under
some general conditions, the mixture of conditional PD
distributions converges to the marginal distribution of the
hazard rates if these are stationary. Proposition A states
this result at the univariate level, which can easily be ex-
tended to the multivariate case.
Proposition A.
Let ht be a stationary and ergodic univariante process
with support in (0 1) ⊂ R. ht has marginal distribution
F ∗ with density function f∗, and conditional distribution
Ft with density function ft satisfying the following:
ft (x) = ϕ
(
x; z1t , ..., z
K
t
)
= ϕ (x; zt) (4)
for any x ∈ (0 1), with ϕ ∈ C ((0 1)× RK). zt is a station-
ary and ergodic vector process with support in RK . The
marginal distribution of zt is Z
∗ =
(
Z∗1, ..., Z∗K
)
with
density function g∗.
Then, the equally weighted mixture Π{1,...,T} of the col-
lection of conditional distributions {F1, ..., FT } generated
by the realization {..., z˙1, z˙2, ..., z˙T , ...} of zt converges in
distribution to F ∗ as T approaches infinity:
Π{1,...,T}
D−→
T→∞
F ∗ (5)
Proof.
See Appendix A.

Proposition A states the convergence for a varied fam-
ily of dynamics for ht, and for ht in the multivariate exten-
sion, including any linear model with constant coefficients
and normal innovations.
6. Empirical analysis
6.1. Data, dynamic models and credit portfolio
We consider as a proxy of hazard rate series the quar-
terly series of charge-off provided by the FDIC7 for “Mort-
7Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, see
http://www.fdic.gov/ .
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Figure 1: Hazard rate series. Shaded areas indicate U.S.
recessions, according to NBER (National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research).
gages” (1-4 Family Residential Real Estate Loans), “Busi-
ness” (Commercial & Industrial Loans to U.S. Addressees),
“Credit Cards” (Credit Cards), “Individuals” (Other Loans
to Individuals), “Rest” (All Other Loans) and “Lease”
(Lease Financing Receivables) between 1991Q1-2010Q4.
These series are similar to those employed by Ro¨sch
and Scheule (2004, 2010) and Lee and Poon (2014). As
discussed therein, they present some shortcomings, like
vulnerability to normative distortions8 or the fact that
they represent a money default ratio instead of a frequency
one. However, due to their systemic nature, they ade-
quately capture the default risk that any standard com-
mercial bank could have experienced. Because the aim of
the analysis is not the estimation of any capital figure per
se but the study of the unconditional measurement, they
are considered appropriate.
Table 1 summarizes the main statistics of the hazard
rate series, Figure 1 presents them and Figure 2 displays
their histograms. Series are not stationary, which makes
them convenient for the purpose of the analysis, and ex-
hibit asymmetric cyclicality, a pattern also noted by Mar-
cucci and Quagliariello (2009). They also present mod-
erate heterogeneity, with some visible differences across
series, although they evolved in a very similar way during
the Great Recession.
As dynamic model, we chose an ARIMA formulation
with probit link function for each hazard rate series. We
do so to focus the analysis on the unconditional PD distri-
bution and not on the underlying econometric formulation.
Thus, a univariate ARIMA model with normal innovations
is fitted to each series xt = N
−1 (ht). Pesaran et al. (2006)
and Bonfim (2009) also consider the probit link function.
This dynamic model generates conditional PD distribu-
8In order to reduce this presumable noise, series are seasonally
adjusted, and 8 out of 480 values are smoothed due to their extreme
outlier condition.
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Series Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max JB test ADF test
Mortgages 0.0010 0.0015 0.0002 0.0004 0.0062 0.0010 0.9667
Business 0.0030 0.0018 0.0012 0.0023 0.0078 0.0133 0.3653
Credit cards 0.0148 0.0044 0.0086 0.0138 0.0282 0.0010 0.8222
Individuals 0.0044 0.0016 0.0021 0.0039 0.0093 0.0016 0.7740
Rest 0.0017 0.0014 0.0004 0.0013 0.0077 0.0010 0.1569
Lease 0.0017 0.0009 0.0005 0.0014 0.0043 0.0075 0.2294
Table 1: Main statistics for the hazard rate series. The p-value is presented for the Jarque-Bera test (JB test) and the
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF test).
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Figure 2: Histograms of the hazard rate series.
tions of the form Ft = Ht = N (Xt), with Xt being the
conditional distribution of xt given all the available infor-
mation up to t − 1. Table 2 summarizes the univariate
ARIMA models, which are identified using the whole sam-
ple, 1991Q1-2010Q4.
Each hazard rate series represents a stand-alone port-
folio formed by a single risk unit, so that there are six
portfolios. We assume that all have infinitely fine-grained
exposures, Gordy (2003), so there is no need to charac-
terize debtors individually. Thus, Eq. 1 is reformulated as
follows:
L = eF ∗ (6)
where e is the total exposure of the single risk unit, e > 0.
In order to better study the PD distributions, we assume
e = 1, which means that L = F ∗ has support in (0 1).
These synthetic portfolios only bear systemic risk, which
facilitates the interpretation of the results without harm-
ing their generality9.
We consider five different types of PD distribution:
 V , estimated from the realization of ht between 1991Q1
and 2010Q4, see Ro¨sch and Scheule (2004).
 ΠC , formed by the conditional PD distributions in-
cluded in the complete time window, 1991Q1-2010Q4.
 ΠD, formed by the conditional PD distributions in-
cluded in the downturn time window, 2008Q1-2010Q4.
 ΠI , formed by the conditional PD distributions in-
cluded in the initial time window, 1991Q1-2000Q4.
 ΠF , formed by the conditional PD distributions in-
cluded in the final time window, 2001Q1-2010Q4.
For each portfolio and PD distribution, we estimate the
capital figure at the regulatory coverage level10, u = 99.9.
Since the hazard rate series are quarterly, the capital also
has a quarterly time horizon. Capital estimates are ob-
tained by Monte Carlo simulation with 1,000,000 realiza-
tions, a number large enough to ensure accuracy. On the
basis of these simulations we also characterize the density
function of the corresponding loss distributions.
Based on these series, models, and portfolios, we study
the performance of the proposed approach and the influ-
ence of the time window on the capital figure.
6.2. Results
Table 3 shows the capital figures, while Figure 3, Fig-
ure 4 and Figure 5 present the comparison between the loss
distribution densities generated by V and ΠC , ΠC and ΠD,
and ΠI and ΠF , respectively.
We first analyze the differences between V and ΠC ,
which means comparing different PD models under the
same time window, and then the differences between ΠC ,
ΠD, ΠI and ΠF , which means comparing different time
windows under the same modeling approach to the uncon-
ditional PD distribution.
9They can easily be extrapolated to a more general portfolio ex-
hibiting both systemic and idiosyncratic risk, since the latter is not
tied to the business cycle.
10Coverage values are expressed in percentage points.
6
Risk Unit
ρ1 ρ2 θ1 θ2
σ̂a LBQ(16) AIC SBC
ρ̂1 σ̂ρ̂1 ρ̂2 σ̂ρ̂2 θ̂1 σ̂θ̂1
θ̂2 σ̂θ̂2
Mortgages - - 0.2120 0.1070 - - - - 0.0670 0.0913 -2.44 -2.38
Business 0.7602 0.1137 - - 0.4882 0.1456 - - 0.0435 0.4473 -3.25 -3.16
Credit Cards - - - - - - - - 0.0359 0.1160 -3.72 -3.69
Individuals 0.6230 0.1443 - - 0.5208 0.2090 -0.2886 0.1183 0.0208 0.1218 -4.69 -4.57
Rest - - - - - - - - 0.0869 0.9121 -1.98 -1.95
Lease - - - - - - - - 0.0712 0.8821 -2.37 -2.34
Table 2: Univariate ARIMA models fitted to xdt , x
d
t = xt − xt−1, being xdt = ρ1xdt−1 + ρ2xdt−2 − θ1at−1 − θ2at−2 + at
and V [at] = (σa)
2
. βˆ, estimated parameter. σ̂βˆ , estimated standard deviation of βˆ. LBQ(16), Ljung–Box Q test p-value
with 16 lags. AIC, Akaike Information Criteria. SBC, Schwarz Information Criteria.
Portfolio V ΠC ΠD ΠI ΠF
Mortgages 0.0085 0.0078 0.0056 0.0011 0.0077
Business 0.0107 0.0072 0.0057 0.0064 0.0069
Credit Cards 0.0164 0.0182 0.0132 0.0066 0.0168
Individuals 0.0069 0.0064 0.0037 0.0013 0.0054
Rest 0.0074 0.0097 0.0093 0.0051 0.0099
Lease 0.0050 0.0046 0.0045 0.0031 0.0046
Table 3: Capital estimate at the 99.9 coverage level. V , Vasicek PD distribution for the complete time window
(1991Q1-2010Q4). ΠC , proposed PD distribution for the complete time window (1991Q1-2010Q4). ΠD, proposed PD
distribution for the downturn time window (2008Q1-2010Q4). ΠI , proposed PD distribution for the initial time window
(1991Q1-2000Q4). ΠF , proposed PD distribution for the final time window (2001Q1-2010Q4).
Regarding the former, differences between the loss den-
sity functions related to V and ΠC are evident in all risk
units. Thus, while the former shows, as expected, a uni-
modal shape, the latter presents a bimodal or even multi-
modal shape consistent with the histograms shown in Fig-
ure 2. This notorious discrepancy shows that the static
approach, when based on a unimodal parametric distri-
bution, may offer a worse fitting than the proposed ap-
proach, as corroborated in Table 4, which presents the p-
value of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness-of-fit test con-
ducted under both models. In fact, the proposed approach
is able to capture such multimodality without introducing
any ad hoc feature in the underlying dynamic model—
e.g., a regime switching mechanism, Hamilton (1989), as in
Bruche and Gonza´lez-Aguado (2010). In other words, the
mixture of conditional PD distributions is flexible enough
to capture, in a parsimonious way, irregular morphologies
when they are present in the data.
Moreover, the inability of the model of Vasicek to prop-
erly capture multimodality leads to heavier PD distribu-
tion tails under this formulation. Figure 6 presents evi-
dence of this effect. It compares the increases in the VaR
figure when the coverage level passes from 99.9 to 99.97
under both V and ΠC . The former generates significantly
higher increases in all portfolios. This result challenges
the conventional idea that presents V as a model that
generates too light tails due to its inner assumption of nor-
mality: It can lead to inflated tails if it is applied under
non-stationarity.
The divergence in density functions generates signifi-
cant differences between their respective capital figures, es-
Portfolio V ΠC
Mortgages 0.0010 0.9289
Business 0.0631 0.9071
Credit Cards 0.1605 0.8232
Individuals 0.5783 0.9944
Rest 0.5085 0.8268
Lease 0.1091 0.7581
Table 4: P-value of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness-
of-fit test applied to the hazard rate sample during the
complete time window (1991Q1-2010Q4). The null hy-
pothesis is that the sample comes from the specified dis-
tribution. V , Vasicek PD distribution for the complete
time window. ΠC , proposed PD distribution for the com-
plete time window.
pecially in Business and Credit Cards, and also in Rest and
Mortgages. These discrepancies indicate that the rigidity
of the model of Vasicek does affect the estimation of capital
requirements. Therefore, if the assumption of stationarity
is not met, the model of Vasicek may offer misleading cap-
ital estimates even if the hazard rate series are assumed to
follow a simple linear dynamic of constant coefficients and
normally distributed innovations. It can be concluded that
the non-stationarity generates model risk, Kerkhof et al.
(2010).
In comparing the different time windows using the pro-
posed approach, Figure 4 and Figure 5 show a displace-
ment to the right of the loss densities generated by ΠD
and ΠF with respect to those generated by ΠC and ΠI ,
respectively. This shift is consistent with the role that the
7
Mortgages
0.0050 0.0150 0.02500
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
PD
D
en
si
ty
 
 
Vasicek
Proposed
Business
0.0067 0.0200 0.03330
100
200
300
400
500
600
PD
D
en
si
ty
 
 
Vasicek
Proposed
Credit Cards
0.0100 0.0300 0.05000
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
PD
D
en
si
ty
 
 
Vasicek
Proposed
Individuals
0.0033 0.0100 0.01670
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
PD
D
en
si
ty
 
 
Vasicek
Proposed
Rest
0.0050 0.0150 0.02500
100
200
300
400
500
600
PD
D
en
si
ty
 
 
Vasicek
Proposed
Lease
0.0033 0.0100 0.01670
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
PD
D
en
si
ty
 
 
Vasicek
Proposed
Figure 3: Density functions of the loss distributions gen-
erated by the Vasicek PD model, V , and the proposed
approach, ΠC , both related to the complete time window
(1991Q1-2010Q4).
Great Recession, the most severe economic crisis included
in the sample, played in each time window. Thus, ΠD is
exclusively devoted to the Great Recession, while ΠC also
captures the rest of the sample. Similarly, ΠF includes the
Great Recession, while ΠI does not. This result shows the
significant effect over the loss distribution of diluting or
omitting the Great Recession from the time window.
The capital figure presents, however, a more peculiar
behavior, being lower in the downturn time window than
in the complete time window, and higher in the final time
window than in the initial time window.
Higher capital figures under ΠC than under ΠD mean
that the increase exhibited by η when the economic sce-
nario is restricted to the Great Recession is smaller than
that experienced by µ, so that k = η − µ decreases. This
result can be analyzed in terms of the different homogene-
ity of the complete and downturn time windows. Thus,
the downturn time window contains a uniform, enclosed
economic scenario (i.e., the Great Recession), so the set of
conditional PD distributions F jt are less dispersed along
the interval (0 1). On the contrary, the complete time
window also includes expansion periods, so the dispersion
is higher. Consequently, ΠD has lower variance than ΠC ,
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Figure 4: Density function of the loss distributions gener-
ated by the PD distributions ΠC , related to the complete
time window (1991Q1-2010Q4), and ΠD, related to the
downturn time window (2008Q1-2010Q4).
which means a shorter distance between the mean and the
VaR of the loss distribution—i.e., a lower capital.
Therefore, increasing the homogeneity of the time win-
dow may reduce the resulting capital estimate even in the
case of the Great Recession. This fact questions the suit-
ability of calculating capital requirements under a gen-
eral downturn scenario with the objective of obtaining a
conservative capital figure. It is worth noting that this
result critically depends on the definition of capital as un-
expected loss, k = η − µ. This is the Basel definition and
makes k strongly sensitive to the variance of L. On the
contrary, if the capital is directly defined as η, then it is
higher in the downturn time window than in the complete
time window, which is the intuitive effect already reported
by Bangia et al. (2002) and Bruche and Gonza´lez-Aguado
(2010), among others.
The homogeneity effect, however, does not fully explain
the higher capital figure obtained under the final time win-
dow than under the initial time window, since both have
the same number of periods and include both expansions
and recessions. Thus, in this case it is also relevant the
fact that under the dynamic model fitted to ht = N (xt),
the variance of the conditional distributions Ft = N (Xt)
8
Mortgages
0.0025 0.0075 0.01250
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
PD
D
en
si
ty
 
 
1991Q1−2000Q4
2001Q1−2010Q4
Business
0.0025 0.0075 0.01250
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
PD
D
en
si
ty
 
 
1991Q1−2000Q4
2001Q1−2010Q4
Credit Cards
0.0100 0.03000
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
PD
D
en
si
ty
 
 
1991Q1−2000Q4
2001Q1−2010Q4
Individuals
0.0025 0.0075 0.01250
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
PD
D
en
si
ty
 
 
1991Q1−2000Q4
2001Q1−2010Q4
Rest
0.0050 0.0150 0.02500
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
PD
D
en
si
ty
 
 
1991Q1−2000Q4
2001Q1−2010Q4
Lease
0.0025 0.00750
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
PD
D
en
si
ty
 
 
1991Q1−2000Q4
2001Q1−2010Q4
Figure 5: Density function of the loss distributions gen-
erated by the PD distributions ΠI , related to the initial
time window (1991Q1-2000Q4), and ΠF , related to the
final time window (2001Q1-2010Q4).
shows a cyclical evolution over time. In other words, it is
higher in those periods related to higher hazard rates, and
vice versa. Since the hazard rate series take higher values
in the final time window than in the initial one, as is shown
in Figure 7, higher conditional PD variances are observed
between 2001Q1 and 2010Q1 than between 1991Q1 and
2000Q4. This results in a higher variance for ΠF than for
ΠI , and consequently in a higher capital estimate for the
former.
Figure 7 also illustrates the difficulty of choosing a full-
business-cycle time window due to the non-stationarity:
Two disjoint time windows, both having a mixed compo-
sition of expansion and recession periods, present quite
different hazard rate series and, as observed in Table 3,
produce quite different capital figures.
The explanation for the cyclical nature of the variance
of the conditional PD distributions can be found in the
probit link function used in the dynamic models fitted to
the hazard rate series. Thus, all series have a unit root and
its additional dynamic structure is weak, so it can be as-
sumed that E [Xt] ≈ xt−1. Since the conditional distribu-
tions Xt have constant variance over time, V [Xt] = υ, the
next delta-approximation to the variance of Ft = N (Xt)
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1
1.05
1.1
1.15
1.2
1.25
1.3
1.35
1.4
Vasicek
Pr
op
os
ed
Figure 6: Increment in the VaR estimate when passing
from u = 99.9 to u = 99.97, 4j = ηju=99.97/ηju=99.9, un-
der the model of Vasicek, displayed at the horizontal axis,
and the proposed approach, displayed at the vertical axis.
Each portfolio is represented by an unidentified point.
can be obtained:
V [Ft] = V [N (Xt)]
≈ n (E [Xt])2 V [Xt]
≈ n (xt−1)2 V [Xt]
= n
(
N−1 (ht−1)
)2
υ
(7)
where n (·) is the density function of the standard normal.
Figure 8 depicts the delta-approximation to the stan-
dard deviation of Xt, g (h) = n
(
N−1 (h)
)√
υ, with h tak-
ing values between the minimum and the maximum of each
hazard rate series over the complete time window. It is a
monotonous increasing function. Figure 9 confirms em-
pirically this cyclical behavior, showing that the variance
of the conditional PD distributions increases in recessions
and decreases in expansions.
This result is a clear example of the influence that the
conditional PD distributions have on the unconditional PD
distribution and, in turn, the influence that the dynamic
model for the hazard rate series has on the conditional PD
distributions themselves.
Other things being equal, it also indicates that the con-
ditional capital, kt = ηt − µt, is cyclical, as it depends on
the variance of Ft. Figure 10 corroborates this hypothesis
in all the portfolios. Although conditional capital cyclical-
ity has been noted by others, like Koopman et al. (2005),
Pederzoli and Torricelli (2005), Truck and Rachev (2005)
and Ro¨sch and Scheule (2010), it had never been presented
as a mere and direct consequence of a modeling decision—
that of resorting to a probit link function for the dynamic
of the hazard rate series.
Therefore, it can be concluded that two forces drive
the capital generated by a time window: The distance be-
tween the conditional PD distributions that form it, which
9
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Figure 7: Hazard rate series during the forty periods
that form the initial time window (1991Q1-2000Q4) and
the final time window (2001Q1-2010Q4).
depends of the homogeneity of the scenario represented,
and their respective variances, which also depend on the
scenario but are shaped by the underlying dynamic model.
These are, in fact, the two forces that drive the variance of
a mixture, McLachlan and Peel (2000). They can present
opposite effects, as happens in the comparison of the com-
plete and downturn time windows, where the homogeneity
prevails.
7. Concluding remarks
This paper addresses the unconditional measurement
of default risk. It contributes to the existing literature by
(i) analyzing the meaning and limitations of the uncondi-
tional measurement when conducted under non-stationarity,
(ii) proposing a new modeling approach to the uncondi-
tional PD distribution, and (iii) studying empirically both
the consequences of such limitations and the properties of
the proposed approach.
These three actions have led to relevant results.
We have shown that the existence of a true uncondi-
tional PD distribution is subjected to the dynamic of the
hazard rate series, and only if they are stationary can it
be properly defined and consistently implemented. If this
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with υ being the variance of Xt and n (·) the density func-
tion of the standard normal. The vertical lines indicate
the minimum and maximum values taken by ht during
the complete time window (1991Q1-2010Q4).
is not the case, the concept must be understood in a more
general sense regarding the use of a balanced time win-
dow in its identification. The choice of such a balanced
time window affects the comparability and stability of the
unconditional capital.
The proposed approach to the unconditional PD distri-
bution differs significantly from the traditional static mod-
eling. It is defined as the equally weighted mixture of the
conditional PD distributions included in the time window,
which grants it a dynamic veneer. We have discussed its
main properties, including its generality, flexibility and co-
herence.
The empirical analysis has shown that non-stationarity
generates multimodal PD distributions. The model of Va-
sicek, which is the regulatory model, does not capture
this feature properly and leads to misleading capital esti-
mates and inflated loss distribution tails. On the contrary,
the proposed approach adequately captures multimodality
even if a simple dynamic model for the hazard rate series
is used. Regarding the time window, the capital figure is
very sensitive to its homogeneity and severity, the latter
effect directly caused by the dynamic model fitted to the
10
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Figure 9: Hazard rate series and percentiles 5th and 95th
of Ft during the complete time window (1991Q1-2010Q4).
Shaded areas indicate U.S. recessions, according to NBER
(National Bureau of Economic Research).
hazard rate series.
A direct implication of these results is the convenience
of undertaking a critical review of the unconditional mea-
surement of default risk, especially in the regulatory frame-
work. Thus, the serious flaws that the model of Vasicek
presents when applied under non-stationarity are a real
concern. A different PD model, or, more generally, a mod-
eling approach different from the static one, should be con-
sidered.
Another reason for rethinking the unconditional mea-
surement is the marked difference in capital estimates that
can be obtained under different full-business-cycle time
windows, as observed in Section 6. Determining such a
time window is a delicate process requiring subjective, al-
though not arbitrary, criteria. Moreover, this subjectiv-
ity suggests that banks may use the time window as a
lever with which to manipulate the resulting capital figure
to their advantage11. Thus, it is of major importance to
evaluate the time window chosen by the bank in the vali-
11The arbitrage opportunities that banks can exploit when calcu-
lating their capital requirements, especially in the regulatory frame-
work, “regulatory capital arbitrage”, have been a recurrent concern
since Basel I, see Jones (2000).
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Figure 10: Hazard rate, ht, and conditional capital, kt,
series. Both are presented standardized. Shaded areas in-
dicate U.S. recessions, according to NBER (National Bu-
reau of Economic Research).
dation of any unconditional loss model, especially if ht is
non-stationary.
Appendix A.
Proof of Proposition A.
Under the conditions of Proposition A, the following is
satisfied for x ∈ (0 1):
f∗ (x) = E [ft (x)]
=
∫
RK ϕ
(
x; z1, ..., zK
)
g∗
(
z1, ..., zK
)
dz1...dzK
= EZ∗1,...,Z∗K
[
ϕ
(
x;Z∗1, ..., Z∗K
)]
(A.1)
On the other hand, given x ∈ (0 1) and the realization
{..., z˙t, ...}, the stationarity and ergodicy of zt produce
the following convergence, Doob (1953):
1
T
T∑
t=1
ϕ
(
x; z˙1t , ..., z˙
K
t
) −−→
T→∞
EZ∗1,...,Z∗K
[
ϕ
(
x;Z∗1, ..., Z∗K
)]
(A.2)
11
Given Eq. A.1 and Eq. A.2, it follows that:
1
T
T∑
t=1
ϕ
(
x; z˙1t , ..., z˙
K
t
) −−→
T→∞
f∗ (x) (A.3)
Or, equivalently,
1
T
T∑
t=1
ft (x) −−→
T→∞
f∗ (x) (A.4)
Eq. A.4 holds for every x ∈ (0 1), which means, according
to Scheffe´’s theorem, Scheffe´ (1947), that:
Π{1,...,T}
D−−→
T→∞
F ∗ (A.5)
since the density function of Π{1,...,T} is 1T
∑T
t=1 ft due to
its condition as an equally weighted mixture, McLachlan
and Peel (2000).

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